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INCORPORATING COMMON LAW
INTO THE CONSTITUTION OF
CANADA: EGALE v. CANADA AND
THE STATUS OF MARRIAGE©
BY MARK D. WALTERS"
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
raise complicated questions about the relationship
between the common law and the Constitution. In
particular, a distinction may now be drawn between
constitutional common law concepts that are
"incorporated" by the Constitution and those that are
"free-standing" or "text-emergent." The author explores
the significance of these distinctions by examining the
argument, accepted in the recent case of EGALE V.
Canada, that the reference to marriage in section 91(26)
of the Constitution serves to incorporate the common law
definition of marriage into the Constitution, thus
preventing federal or provincial legislation from
legalizing same-sex marriages.
Les r6cents arrets de la Cour Supreme du Canada
soul.vent des interrogations complexes sur la relation
entre la common lawet la Constitution. En particulier, on
peut dor6navant 6tablir une distinction entre d'une part,
les concepts constitutionnels de la common law
"incorpor6s" par la Constitution et d'autre part, ceux qui
sont "autonomes" ou "se d~gagent des textes." L'auteur
scrute la signification de ces distinctions en examinant
I'argument, requ lots de la recente affaire EGALE contre
le Canada, selon lequel la rif6rence au mariage figurant
& I'article 91 (26) de la Constitution sert h incorporer A Is
Constitution la d~finition du mariage que donne la
common law, empechant dis lots la 16gislation f~d~rale
ou provinciale de I6galiser les mariages entre personnes
du meme sexe.
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[A] statute hath no auctoritie to prohibite nor to confourme no ryghte of matrimonie: but
as the churche prohibiteth it, or confermeth it. And therefore if hit were prohibited, that no
lordes sonne shulde affie an housbande mannes daughter, or suche other and if he dyd
thaffiaunce to be voyde, I thynke that statute were voyde.
Christopher St. German, Doctor and Student (1531)'
This statement, written by Christopher St. German about 470 years
ago, appears today as a dusty relic of another constitutional era. St.
German's assertion that matrimony, or at least a certain conception of it,
constitutes a constraint upon Parliament is inconsistent with the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty developed in England during the seventeenth
century and later exported in modified form to Canada and other former
British colonies. It would be unusual today for a judge to conclude that the
traditional conception of marriage limits federal (and, by implication,
provincial) parliamentary authority in Canada. Yet, the recent case of
EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada2 provides such an example. In EGALE, Justice
Pitfield of the British Columbia Supreme Court held that the federal
Parliament is prohibited from exercising its exclusive authority over
marriage, pursuant to subsection 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867,' to
alter the common law definition of marriage, and, therefore, that
Parliament cannot legalize same-sex marriages. Justice Pitfield
acknowledged that provincial legislatures have the authority pursuant to
subsection 92(13) (property and civil rights) to formalize and recognize
same-sex relationships, but, given their lack of authority over the capacity
of people to marry, the clear implication of EGALE is that neither federal
nor provincial legislatures can enact same-sex marriage legislation. Justice
Pitfield may be separated from St. German by nearly five hundred years,
but he shares with him a common approach to marriage and parliamentary
authority-namely, that the one constrains the other.
The EGALE judgment can be viewed as part of a larger judicial
narrative about legislative authority and common, or unwritten, law. This
theme is an old one, but in Canada it has become more pronounced and
1Christopher St. German, Dialogue Between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws of
England, ed. by T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton (London: Selden Society, 1974) at 331 [Doctor and
Student]. Doctor and Student consists of the First Dialogue, first published in 1523, the Second Dialogue,
first published in 1530, and thirteen additional chapters, entitled NewAdditions, published in 1531. The
above quotation is taken from New Additions. See Plucknett & Barton, eds., "Introduction" at xiv-xv.
2 [2001] 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122 (B.C. S.C.) [EGALE].
3 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [Constitution].
[VOL. 4 1, NO. I
EGALE and the Status of Marriage
complicated in recent years.4 Judges have confirmed that parliamentary
sovereignty in Canada is constrained by a number of unwritten principles.
Some of these unwritten principles are treated as free-standing norms with
sources exterior to the written Constitution (e.g., judicial independence and
the rule of law), while others are treated as text-emergent norms derived
from contextual readings of written instruments (e.g., federalism and
respect for minorities).5 These two types of unwritten constitutional law
may be contrasted with text-incorporated common law principles that have
been elevated to constitutional status and given a normative footing within
the written Constitution (e.g., Aboriginal rights).6 The principal difference
among these categories is the conceptual distance between the written
constitutional texts and the practical legal rules enforced by judges over
legislatures: that distance is great for free-standing unwritten norms, less so
for text-emergent unwritten norms, and generally small or non-existent for
text-incorporated unwritten norms. As the distance between common law
and the written constitutional text increases, so does the need for judges to
justify, with a particular form of principled argument, decisions that
characterize common law as supreme over legislatures. The synthesis of
common law and constitutional law in EGALE ultimately fails because
Justice Pitfield wrongly assumed that there is little or no conceptual
distance to cover between the common law definition of marriage and the
written Constitution, and little or no need to offer a principled justification
for the elevation of common law into the Constitution.
In this article I will explore the idea of marriage as a common law
construct and suggest reasons why this construct cannot be considered as
a constitutional norm binding upon both federal and provincial legislatures.
4 See e.g. Dale Gibson, "Constitutional Vibes: Reflections on the Secession Reference and the
Unwritten Constitution" (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 49; Robin Elliott, "References, Structural
Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada's Constitution" (2001) 80 Can. Bar. Rev. 67;
Mark D. Walters, "The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as
Fundamental Law" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91 [Walters, "Common Law Constitution"]; and Jean Leclair,
"Canada's Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles" (2002) 27 Queen's L.J. 389.
5 These labels are developed further in Walters, "Common Law Constitution", ibid. at 97-98,
relying upon, interalia, Manitoba ProvincialJudgesAssn. v. Manitoba (Minister ofJustice), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
3 [Provincial Judges], Lamer C.J.C. (judicial independence is "at root an unwritten constitutional
principle" because its legal "home" is "exterior" to Canada's written constitutional texts at 63-64)
[emphasis in original]; Reference Re the Secession of Quebec from Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [Quebec
Secession Reference] (unwritten principles of federalism and respect for minorities "emerge" from a
contextual "understanding of the constitutional text itself," and in particular from the "political
compromise[s]" that led to specific written constitutional provisions at 240, 261-262).
6 See Mitchell v. Canada (M.N.R.), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at 927, McLachlin C.J.C. Aboriginal rights
enjoyed a common law status and were then elevated to constitutional status by the Constitution Act,
1982, s. 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Constitution Act 1982].
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Courts in Ontario and Quebec have concluded that Justice Pitfield erred
by failing to subject the meaning of marriage in subsection 91(26) to the so-
called living-tree doctrine that secures interpretative dynamism in Canadian
constitutional law.' I think they were right in reaching this conclusion;
however, the living-tree doctrine will not be the focus of my comments.
Instead, I will concentrate on analyzing a proposition that is logically prior
to and independent of any consideration of the living-tree doctrine-the
mechanical correlation between marriage in the constitutional text and
marriage as defined at common law. In Part II, I will argue that how the
issue is approached may affect the manner in which the living-tree doctrine
is applied, and in Part III, I will argue that a proper consideration of
legislative authority and the common law in Canada may lead to the
conclusion that resort to the living-tree doctrine may be unnecessary to
support Parliament's jurisdiction over same-sex marriage. First, however,
it is necessary to analyze the legal challenges to the heterosexual definition
of marriage and, in particular, Justice Pitfield's reasons for concluding that
the common law definition of marriage is an entrenched constitutional
norm.
I. EGALE, HALPERN, AND HENDRICKS
The issue of same-sex marriage is the subject of legal, political, and
moral debate in Canada and other jurisdictions.' Applying the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,9 the Supreme Court of Canada has held
that at least certain legislative benefits granted to heterosexual spouses
must be extended to same-sex couples,10 and both federal and provincial
7 Halpern v. Canada (A.G.) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 321 at 404-411 (Div. Ct.), LaForme J. [Halpern];
Hendnicksc. Quebec (Procureurgin~ral), [2002] J.Q. no 3816 at paras. 111-122 (C.S.) (QL) [Hendricks].
8 In the Canadian context, see e.g. Bruce MacDougall, "The Celebration of Same-Sex Marriage"
(2000-2001) 32 Ottawa L. Rev. 235; Nicholas Bala, "Alternatives for Extending Spousal Status in
Canada" (2000) 17 Can. J. Fam. L. 169; Kathleen A. Lahey, Are We 'Persons' Yet?: Law and Sexuality
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 254-261; Martha Bailey, "How Will Canada
Respond to Same-Sex Marriages?" (1998) 32 Creighton L. Rev. 105; and Alice Woolley, "Excluded by
Definition: Same-Sex Couples and the Right to Marry" (1995) 45 U.T.L.J. 471. For European
developments, see Caroline Forder, "European Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of
Choice" (2000) 17 Can. J. Fam. L. 371. For the American context, see e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
Case For Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty To Civilized Commitment (New York: Free Press,
1996); and L.D. Wardle, "Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from
Marriage by Redefining Marriage" (1998) 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 735.
9Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [Charter].
10 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
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legislatures have responded accordingly." In light of these judgments, it was
only a matter of time before the heterosexual definition of marriage itself
was challenged under the Charter. The definition of marriage as the union
of one man and one woman is a common law rather than statutory rule, at
least in the common law provinces.1 2 In Quebec, this definition was implicit
in the 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada, which, on this point, applied until
new civil code provisions were confirmed by federal legislation in 2001;
these new provisions explicitly define marriage as heterosexual.13 The
heterosexual definition is also confirmed by an interpretive provision in the
federal Modernization of Benefits Act. 4 These two recent federal statutes
suggest that Parliament is resistant to the idea of legalizing same-sex
marriages.
Same-sex couples therefore resorted to Charter litigation in British
Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec to establish a right to marry, arguing that
the heterosexual definition of marriage found at common law and, in
Quebec, in legislation, is a violation of section 15 equality rights under the
Charter that cannot be justified under section 1. The argument failed in
British Columbia in EGALE, but it succeeded before the Ontario Divisional
Court in Halpern,5 which held the common law definition of marriage
invalid, and before the Quebec Superior Court in Hendricks," which held
the statutory definition invalid. In both Halpern and Hendricks the judges
declined to articulate an alternative definition suspending the effect of their
rulings for two years to give Parliament time to develop a non-
discriminatory approach to marriage. The federal government has
responded to these decisions on two fronts: first, on the legal front, it insists
See e.g. Amendments Because of The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H., S.O. 1999,
c. 6; and Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12.
12 See e.g. Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations) (1993), 14 O.R.
(3d) 658 (Div. Ct.).
13 See Arts. 115-185 C.C.L.C. These articles continued to govern the validity of marriage in
Quebec by virtue of section 129 of the Constitution until 2001 (see note 94 below). The heterosexual
definition of marriage was made explicit by Quebec when the Code was amended in 1994. See Art. 365
C.C.Q., which provides: "Marriage may be contracted only between a man and a woman expressing
openly their free and enlightened consent." Insofar as this provision touched upon the federal power
over marriage it was ineffective until confirmed by federal legislation, which was enacted in 2001. See
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, s. 5: "Marriage requires the free and
enlightened consent of a man and a woman to be the spouse of the other."
14 The Modernization of Benefits and ObligationsAct, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1 provides: "For greater
certainty, the amendments made by this Act do not affect the meaning of the word 'marriage', that is,
the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others."
15 Supra note 7.
16 Supra note 7.
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that the heterosexual definition of marriage is not unconstitutional and it
is therefore appealing Halpern and Hendricks; second, on the political front,
it has initiated public consultations and parliamentary deliberations on
same-sex unions and marriage. 7 In November 2002, the Department of
Justice issued a discussion paper that suggests, whatever the ultimate
outcome on the legal front, on the political front Parliament could elect to
do one of the following: (1) keep the heterosexual definition of marriage
but provide for a "civil union or domestic partnership" equivalent to
marriage for same-sex couples; (2) legalize same-sex marriages; or (3)
eliminate legal references to marriage and, with provincial cooperation,
create a neutral registry for all conjugal relationships in its place, leaving
marriage as a purely private and religious designation.' 8 The discussion
paper concedes that the first option would be legally and politically difficult
if Halpern and Hendricks are upheld on appeal, and EGALE is reversed: a
non-marriage equivalent for same-sex couples might still fail to meet
constitutional standards, in which case the paper observes that Parliament
could invoke the section 33 notwithstanding clause to immunize it from a
Charter challenge or resort to the second or third options.'9 The prospects
for same-sex marriage in Canada are therefore far from clear, and much
depends upon the fate of EGALE Halpern, and Hendricks at the appellate
levels. The proposition articulated in EGALE-that the Constitution
incorporates the common law definition of marriage-was argued by
counsel but rejected by the courts in both Halpern and Hendricks. There is
no doubt that it will be argued again at each of the three provincial courts
of appeal and potentially at the Supreme Court of Canada. The argument
raises troubling questions about the relationship between written and
unwritten constitutional law and it is worth considering in detail.
In EGALE, Justice Pitfield accepted that Charter rights to equality
were infringed by the common law definition of marriage but concluded
that the infringements were justified pursuant to section 1. This conclusion
was, however, an alternative ground for rejecting the claim. The primary
ground was his conclusion that the common law definition of marriage had
been entrenched by subsection 91(26) of the Constitution. Justice Pitfield
17 On November 12, 2002, the Minister of Justice referred the following question to the House
of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights: "Given our constitutional framework
and the traditional meaning of marriage, should Parliament take measures to recognize same sex unions
and, if so, what should they be?" The bases for these deliberations and public consultations are found
in Department of Justice, Marriage and Legal Recognition of Same-sex Unions: A Discussion Paper
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2002).
18 Ibid. at 21-27.
19 Ibid. at 22-23.
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presented his reasoning in this respect as a traditional federal division-of-
powers analysis. He began with the proposition that the entire range of
legislative authority in Canada is divided between federal and provincial
legislatures by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution and that it therefore
"permits one or other, but not both, of Parliament or the provincial
legislatures to enact legislation that will publicly sanction and recognize
same-sex relationships."20 He narrowed the potential heads of power under
which same-sex relationships might fall to the federal power over marriage
and divorce pursuant to subsection 91(26) and the provincial power over
property and civil rights pursuant to subsection 92(13).21 Earlier in his
judgment he asserted that, in the absence of a statutory definition, marriage
is a "relationship defined by common, or judge-made, law, '' 22 and he
adopted the definition articulated by the House of Lords in 1866 that
marriage is "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the
exclusion of all others."23 The transformation of this common law definition
into a constitutional constraint on Parliament came swiftly and without
much analysis. "There is nothing to suggest," stated Justice Pitfield, "that
'marriage', in s. 91(26), was used in any context other than its legal context
as understood in 1867." Federal legislation changing the common law
definition of marriage would therefore be an unlawful attempt to
"unilaterally amend the Constitution."'  He acknowledged that the
Constitution is generally regarded as "a living tree capable of growth and
expansion" and that its provisions are not to be read in a "narrow and
technical" way but rather should be given a "large and liberal" reading
allowing "development through usage and convention." 5 However, he
refused to apply this living-tree rule of construction to subsection 91(26).
"None of the words [in sections 91 and 92] that have been construed in a
liberal manner"-such as Banking or Trade and Commerce, for
instance-"were legal relationships created by the common law," he said;
non-legal words permit a "fluid interpretation," but words referring to
"legal construct[s]," such as marriage, do not.26 Therefore the federal
marriage power in subsection 91(26) must retain its original common law
20 EGALE, supra note 2 at 142.
21 Ibid. at 142-143.
22 Ibid. at 138.
23 Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 at 130 (H.L).
24 EGALE, supra note 2 at 143.
25 Edwards v. Canada (A.G.), [1930] A.C. 124 at 136 (P.C.), Sankey L.C.
26EGALE, supra note 2 at 144-145 [emphasis added].
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boundary, one that excludes same-sex relationships. Justice Pitfield
concluded that same-sex relationships are "a matter of civil rights" under
provincial jurisdiction pursuant to subsection 92(13) and that a provincial
legislature could provide for the "formalization and recognition" of same-
sex relationships "should it wish to do so."27
Although the analysis of constitutional authority over same-sex
relationships in EGALE is presented as a traditional division-of-powers
analysis, it is not traditional. Justice Pitfield is clear about two things:
Parliament cannot legalize same-sex marriages, but provincial legislatures
may formalize and recognize same-sex relationships. That leaves the obvious
question: Can provincial legislatures select marriage as a means of
formalizing and recognizing same-sex relationships? Unless they can, the
reasoning in EGALE means that neither federal nor provincial legislatures
may legalize same-sex marriages. It must therefore be concluded that the
constitutionalization of the common law definition of marriage results in
something that, on the traditional view, is not supposed to exist: a "gap" or
"hiatus" in legislative power between sections 91 and 92.' Courts have
traditionally assumed that the sole purpose of the heads of power listed in
sections 91 and 92 is to divide otherwise plenary legislative power between
two levels of government, and, therefore, within the internal confines of
those sections, the only limit to the power conferred by section 91 is section
92 and vice versa. 9 The two sections must be read together to ensure a
continuum of legislative power,3" and attempts to limit legislative authority
by isolated consideration of the attributes of a particular head of power are
"meaningless or at least defective."" Using the common law concept of
marriage as the limit to federal legislative competence over marriage is
therefore defective-unless it can be said that the common law limit is
necessary to prevent federal incursion into a provincial sphere of legislative
competence.
What sphere of provincial legislative authority would be infringed
by a federal law legalizing same-sex marriage? Is there a provincial same-
sex marriage power-a provincial power to either legalize or prohibit same-
sex marriages? Justice Pitfield did not suggest that there was, and for good
27Ibid. at 147.
28 Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 at 114-115 (P.C.), Haldane V.
29Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, [1887] 12 A.C. 575 at 588 (P.C.), Hobhouse L.
30 Paquet v. Pilot Corporation, [1920] A.C. 1029 at 1031 (P.C.), Haldane V.; Reference Re Waters
and Water-Powers, [1929] S.C.R. 200 at 217, Duff J.; andAlberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1939] A.C.
117 at 129-130 (P.C.), Maugham L.C.
Albert S. Abel, "The Neglected Logic of 91 and 92" (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 487 at 499.
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reason. The text of the Constitution makes marriage a federal matter
(section 91(26)) and solemnization of marriage a provincial matter (section
92(12))-the former covering capacity to marry, the latter the procedures
necessary to marry32-- and it cannot be argued that a provincial power over
the capacity of same-sex couples to marry exists. Provinces may formalize
and recognize same-sex relationships, but they may not select marriage as
a means of doing so, nor may they prohibit same-sex marriages.
Legislative provisions in Alberta33 and Quebec that purport to
define marriage as heterosexual are, at best, declaratory of the (traditional)
common law and civil law definitions, respectively, and cannot, as a matter
of constitutional law, prohibit the federal Parliament from enacting
legislation legalizing same-sex marriages (a point that counsel for Quebec
acknowledged in argument in Hendricks and that, at any rate, became moot
once Quebec's legislation was confirmed by federal legislation).35 Indeed,
because the common law and civil code rules governing capacity to marry
fall within federal legislative competence, these provincial statutes could
not even prevent the judicial reinterpretation of the common law or civil
code rules to permit same-sex marriage. Furthermore, if courts must
reinterpret the common law and civil code definitions of marriage to
include same-sex unions in order to secure Charter values, then such
Charter-driven reinterpretations cannot be precluded by provincial attempts
to immunize the heterosexual definition of marriage from Charter review
by use of the section 33 notwithstanding clause (as Alberta's Marriage Act
purports to do).36
32 Leslie Katz, "The Scope of the Federal Legislative Authority in Relation to Marriage" (1975)
7 Ottawa L. Rev. 384.
3 3 Marriage Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-5, s. 1(c), defines marriage as meaning "a marriage between a
man and a woman."
3 4 Art. 365 C.C.Q. limits marriage to opposite-sex couples (see note 13 above). For judicial doubts
regarding the constitutionality of this provision, see Droit de la famille-2161, [1995] R.D.F. 237 at 239
(C.S.), Senecal J.; M.C. v. M.M., [2001] R.J.Q. 518 at 526 (C.S.), Guthrie J. For confirmatory federal
legislation see supra note 13.
3 5 Broddy v. Alberta (1982), [1983] 41 A.R. 255 (C.A.) upheld the validity of an Alberta statute on
the capacity of relatives through adoption to marry on the basis that it related to adoption, a provincial
matter. The preamble to Alberta's Marriage Act, supra note 33, purports to link the heterosexual
definition of marriage to a provincial head of power in a similar manner, stating that the definition is
"fundamental in considering the solemnization of marriage," which is a provincial matter under s.
92(12)). However, if the solemnization power permits provinces to define capacity to marry, the federal
power over marriage would be reduced to nothing. For Quebec's position in Hendricks, see supra note
7 at para. 123.
36 Section 1.1(a) of Alberta's Marriage Act, supra note 33, provides that the Act "operates
notwithstanding ... provisions of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,"
a provision made pursuant to s. 33 of the Charter.
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Given the federal power over capacity to marry the question
remains: What provincial power would be infringed by a federal same-sex
marriage law? The essence of Justice Pitfield's argument is that such a law
would infringe the exclusive provincial power under subsection 92(13) to
formalize and recognize same-sex relationships by means other than
marriage. He portrayed same-sex relationships as a zero-sum game, with
one or the other but not both of Parliament and provincial legislatures
having jurisdiction to sanction and recognize same-sex relationships. Once
he found same-sex relationships to be a matter of civil rights under
provincial jurisdiction, it followed (according to the zero-sum premise) that
a federal same-sex marriage law would be ultra vires. This reasoning has at
least the look of a traditional division-of-powers analysis (although it still
leaves the above-noted gap over same-sex marriage); however, it played at
best a secondary role in EGALE. The stated reason given by Justice Pitfield
for the conclusion that a federal same-sex marriage law would be
unconstitutional is that it would violate the common law definition of
marriage, a limitation on subsection 91(26) that he identified without any
reference to competing provincial powers.
In the end, it must be said that the language in EGALE of the
federal-provincial division of powers obscures what amounts to a very
different sort of constitutional reasoning, one in which a substantive rather
than a division-of-powers limitation is imposed on legislative authority. The
common law limit to the federal marriage power is not required to prevent
federal infringement of an exclusive field of provincial legislative authority;
rather, it stops federal legislation even when no provincial power would be
infringed. Justice Pitfield's zero-sum premise-that one or the other, but
not both, levels of legislature may formalize and sanction same-sex
relationships-is highly suspect. Consider, for example, constitutional
authority over opposite-sex relationships. Provinces have the authority
pursuant to subsection 92(13) to legislate on issues of property rights,37
child adoption, custody, and welfare38 as they relate to married spouses, and
they have the authority to recognize and formalize non-marital opposite-sex
conjugal relationships and to extend to those relationships provincial
legislation on married spouses relating to property and children.39 If the
37K v. K (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 290 at 298 (Man. C.A.); Zacks v. Zacks, [1973] S.C.R. 891; and
Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285.
38 Reference ReAdoption Act, [1938] S.C.R. 398; Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 751; Reference Re B.C. Family RelationsAct, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 62.
39 Indeed, the absence of provincial recognition of opposite-sex relationships for the purpose of
extending benefits given to married spouses is, in some cases, a violation of section 15 of the Charter.
See Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
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federal power over opposite-sex marriages can co-exist with this provincial
power to recognize and sanction non-marital opposite-sex relationships for
the purposes of regulating matters of provincial jurisdiction, there is no
reason to think that a federal power to legalize same-sex marriages would
interfere with the provincial authority to recognize and sanction same-sex
relationships for similar purposes. Nova Scotia legislation defines
''common-law partner" in a gender-neutral manner and permits both
opposite-sex and same-sex couples to make "domestic-partner
declarations" to claim certain property rights enjoyed by married spouses.4
The authority of the province to formalize and recognize such non-marital
opposite-sex and same-sex relationships in this manner for the purposes of
regulating property law issues that fall within provincial legislative
competence is not inconsistent with the right of opposite-sex couples in
Nova Scotia to marry if they have the capacity to do so under federal laws
relating to marriage. Nor would it be inconsistent with the right of same-sex
couples in Nova Scotia to marry, if such a right existed. In short, while there
is clearly a provincial authority to regulate certain aspects of same-sex
relationships, there is no area of exclusive provincial authority that would
be infringed by a federal same-sex marriage law.
The effect of EGALE, then, is to recognize the common law
definition of marriage not as a mere dividing line between provincial and
federal powers but as a substantive, constitutionally entrenched principle
that limits federal and provincial legislative authority in Canada absolutely.
It is for this reason that the case presents an opportunity to explore some
of the difficult theoretical issues surrounding the relationship between
common, or unwritten, law and supreme constitutional law in Canada,
particularly the question of how mere common law principles that are
normally subject to parliamentary sovereignty come to occupy a position
within the Constitution that defines and limits parliamentary sovereignty at
both federal and provincial levels. In exploring this issue, the internal
divisions between federal and provincial legislatures are not important; the
real question is how unwritten, or common law, principles obtain a status
within the constitutional hierarchy such that they control or limit all sources
of legislative authority in Canada.
As noted at the outset, courts now acknowledge three general types
of common, or unwritten, laws with supreme constitutional status that are
therefore binding upon both federal and provincial legislatures: free-
standing unwritten norms, text-emergent unwritten norms, and text-
40 An Act to Comply with Certain Court Decisions and to Modernize and Reform Laws in the
Province, S.N.S. 2000, c. 29.
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incorporated unwritten norms.'" The first two types are genuinely
unwritten, in the sense that their normative force as supreme laws cannot
reasonably be ascribed to the written parts of the Constitution; the third
type, however, contains norms that, having been incorporated into the
written Constitution, obtain their constitutional force directly from the
written Constitution. Given this difference, there will be less need for judges
to justify the identification of text-incorporated unwritten norms as
supreme constitutional laws than is the case with free-standing or text-
emergent unwritten norms. In theory, at least, the constitutional status of
text-incorporated norms derives not from judicial justification but from a
constitutional settlement reached and justified by the political actors who
framed the written constitutional text. The same cannot be said of free-
standing and text-emergent unwritten norms, so convincing and principled
independent justifications for their status as supreme constitutional laws
must be given by judges, justifications that will usually involve overt
integration of legal analyses with moral, political, and historical analyses.42
Even in relation to text-incorporated common law norms, however,
there will likely be at least some conceptual distance between the common
law rule being incorporated and the written provision that is purported to
achieve the incorporation. Similarly, there will be some need for a
principled justification for the conclusion that the written text actually
serves to incorporate the common law norm. In fact, there are very few
examples of written constitutional provisions that expressly incorporate
common law or unwritten norms. The language of section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982-"existing aboriginal and treaty rights are hereby
recognized and affirmed"-is perhaps as direct as the Constitution gets in
this respect, yet courts have still rejected the suggestion that Aboriginal
rights are restricted to the common law as it stood in 1982."3 The language
of subsection 91(26) is far less direct than that of section 35(1). It does not
explicitly incorporate the common law definition of marriage as a limit on
federal legislative sovereignty; to the contrary, in the words of William
Lederman, it seems to allocate legislative power over a "class" of "actual
and potential laws."' Of course, this power has limits. It is restricted by
competing heads of provincial jurisdiction listed in section 92, by other
See notes 5 and 6 above.
42 See generally Walters, "Common Law Constitution", supra note 4.
R v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1106, Dickson C.J.C. and LaForest J.; Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at 1106-1107, Lamer C.J.C.
44 William R. Lederman, Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas: Essays on the
Constitutional History, Public Law and Federal System of Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 229
[emphasis added].
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parts of the written Constitution (e.g., the Charter), and by unwritten
principles that have been held to form part of the supreme Constitution. It
is not at all clear from the written text, however, that in addition to these
limitations, this power, and by implication provincial legislative authority
as well, is limited by an a priori conception of what marriage is or what
marriage could legitimately be. Nor is it clear that even if some a priori
conception of marriage limits federal (and by implication provincial)
legislative authority that conception is the narrow common law definition
of marriage or a broader gender-neutral definition. The use of any such
conception, narrow or broad, that is not dictated by the need to prevent
federal incursion into provincial legislative territory will lead to a
doctrinally awkward gap in legislative power between sections 91 and 92.
Hence, the justification for adopting any such conception of marriage
(narrow or broad) as a limitation on the federal marriage power would have
to explain why a deviation from the traditional approach to legislative
power under sections 91 and 92 is required. Such deviations may be
justified. It has been held, for example, that sections 91 and 92 do not
exhaust all legislative power in Canada but must be read in light of
unwritten constitutional principles securing residual spheres of Aboriginal
self-government.45 Assuming that this first point can be satisfactorily
addressed and the conclusion is that legislative sovereignty in Canada is
restricted absolutely by some a priori conception of marriage, the case must
still be made for saying that it is the common law definition rather than
some other definition that represents the constitutionally entrenched
definition of marriage. If the common law definition of marriage is treated
as incorporated by the mere use of the word "marriage" in subsection
91(26), the distance between this common law definition and the written
language of subsection 91(26) suggests the need for judicial justification on
the above two points that approximates the analytical rigour that
accompanies the judicial identification of unwritten constitutional norms
of a free-standing or text-emergent sort. It needs a demonstration that
inclusion of the common law of marriage within Canada's supreme
constitutional law is necessary for the structural coherence of the
Constitution as a whole in light of the moral, political, and social values that
it aspires to embrace and protect.
In EGALE no such rigorous principled justification for incorporation
was given. The only justification Justice Pitfield gave was what may be
called a modified original-intent argument. He acknowledged that the
meanings of constitutional words and phrases evolve under the living-tree
45 Campbell v. British Columbia (A.G.) (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333 (B.C. S.C.) [Campbell].
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doctrine, but only non-legal words and phrases; constitutional provisions
that refer to legal constructs, including those created by the common law,
must retain the original meanings intended by the framers of the
Constitution. Justice Pitfield did not refer to historical evidence to identify
the framers' intentions about marriage but simply observed that "[tihere is
nothing to suggest" that marriage was not used in 1867 in its common law
sense. Elsewhere in his judgment he asserted that marriage had a deep
social, religious, and moral meaning in 1867 and was considered by the
framers to be of such "pressing and substantial national importance" as to
warrant its inclusion within federal authority.4 6 Under his own modified
original-intent theory, however, the conclusion that the framers thought
marriage was important would not, on its own, immunize the constitutional
reference to marriage from the living-tree rule of construction. To escape
the living-tree rule, it was necessary (according to his theory) to
demonstrate that the word or phrase the framers had selected was a
reference to a legal construct. Yet Justice Pitfield offered no argument in
relation to this particular point: the equation between common law and
constitutional law references to marriage was automatic, mechanical, and
immediate. He did not acknowledge any conceptual distance between
common law and written text that needed explaining: the use of a
supposedly technical legal term by the written text was presumed to be a
reference to that technical legal term.
Justice Pitfield's approach to the Constitution, the common law, and
the living-tree doctrine is novel and will not likely survive on appeal; it was
rejected in both Halpern and Hendricks. Justice Pitfield must be wrong to
conclude that marriage is "the only word in either s. 91 or 92 [referring to
a legal] construct."47 If his approach to marriage were applied consistently,
then federal and provincial legislatures would be prohibited from altering
the 1867 definitions of bankruptcy, insolvency, patents, copyrights,
naturalization, and aliens. Also, the application of a different rule of
construction to legal and non-legal words and phrases in the Constitution
would threaten interpretative coherence. Once a dynamic living-tree
principle is accepted as a general rule of constitutional construction,48 it
46 EGALE, supra note 2 at 160.
47 Ibid. at 145.
48 For a discussion regarding the general acceptance of the rule, see Peter W. Hogg, "The Charter
of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87 at 97-98. For
recent judicial support for the living-tree doctrine see Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 5 at 248;
Reference Re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 at 209-210;
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 at 404; and Canada (A.G.) v.
Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 at 618.
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follows that the coherent growth of the Constitution requires its consistent
application to all parts of the document; to exempt some words and
phrases, but not others, from at least the possibility of organic development
over time may result in a deformed and unhealthy constitutional tree.
In the following analysis I will assume that the failure to apply the
living-tree doctrine was an error. I will argue that in addition to this error,
there is a general assumption in EGALE about the relationship between
constitutional law and common law that is problematic and requires
exposure and distinct analysis, and that by focusing on the living-tree issue
alone this underlying problem may be obscured. It is important to observe
that the approach in EGALE to the relationship between common law and
constitutional law is based on two distinct propositions. The first
proposition is that written constitutional references to concepts created by
the common law must be taken as entrenching the common law at the time
the Constitution was framed. The second proposition is that the living-tree
rule of construction that generally applies to the Constitution does not apply
to these common law constitutional words and phrases. Even if we assume
that the second proposition is false (as we must) we are left with the first
proposition, and it raises fundamental concerns about the theoretical
relationship between common law and constitutional law in Canada that I
wish to explore. In the next two parts I will therefore focus upon the first
proposition; I will argue in Part II that the equation of constitutional words
with pre-existing legal constructs may in many cases be inappropriate and
may distort the manner in which the living-tree rule of construction
operates. I will argue that the treatment of marriage as a legal construct is
a good example of this potential danger. In Part III, I will argue that a
proper consideration of common law and legislative authority in Canadian
constitutional history may render the application of the living-tree doctrine
unnecessary in relation to certain areas of legislative authority that have
been historically constrained by common law notions-and that, again, the
example of marriage illustrates this point.
II. MARRIAGE AS A "LEGAL CONSTRUCT"
The argument in EGALE that marriage is a relationship "created by
the common law"49 and that this common law meaning was entrenched by
the constitutional reference to marriage is premised on a particular
jurisprudential vision about the nature of law and what it means to say that
an idea, principle, or norm has a common law status. Underlying EGALE is
49 EGALE, supra note 2 at 145.
2003]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
a form of legal positivism according to which social, religious, or moral
norms are legally irrelevant until acknowledged as law by a legislature or
court; once acknowledged by positive law, that law exists as such
independently of whatever social, religious, or moral context it might have.
From this perspective, "marriage" can be characterized as an empirical
artifact created by common law judges and fixed by them with a certain
meaning. When another piece of positive law, the Constitution, uses the
same word, there is, from this positivist perspective, no other legally
relevant concept to which that word could refer except this detached
common law artifact.
Before this reasoning can be assessed, it is necessary to explore the
senses in which an idea like marriage can be said to enjoy a common law
status. It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a full jurisprudential
analysis of this issue, so I will limit the inquiry to a consideration of how
common law judges characterized marriage historically; after all, Justice
Pitfield's analysis hinges on the assumption that judges and legislators in
1867 would have shared the positivist approach to marriage that he
developed. I will begin with a discussion of marriage at English common
law and then consider the law of matrimony in the colonial context with
particular emphasis on pre-confederation Canadian law.
A. Mariage and English Common Law
The relationship of "husband and wife," wrote Sir William
Blackstone, is "founded in nature" though modified by "civil society."5
Thus, the prohibitions on polygamy and divorce-two important parts of
the definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman for
life-were described by Blackstone as derived from "natural law," "canon
law," and "divine revealed law."'" English law turned to the law of nature
and canon law-which were both closely associated with the continental
civilian tradition-because it had no law of marriage of its own.5 2 In
England, matrimonial issues fell within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical
courts. 3 "[T]hose Courts alone," observed Lord Campbell, "took direct
cognisance of the validity of marriage; and when the question arose
50 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1765) at 410 [emphasis in original].
51 Ibid. at 423, 428-29.
52 Frederic William Maitland, Roman Canon Law in the Church of England (London: Methuen
& Co., 1898) at 39-40.
53 Collins v. Jessot (1704), 6 Mod. 155 at 157 (K.B.);Jesson v. Collins (1704), 2 Salk. 437 (K.B.).
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incidentally before the common-law Judges"-as it often did in actions for
dower or other.property rights-"they referred themselves to the Bishop
as the ecclesiastical Judge, and were governed by the certificate, which he
returned."' These "Courts Christian" remained under the supervision of
the See of Rome until 1533 and did not lose their jurisdiction over
matrimonial causes until 1857."5 The ecclesiastical courts applied not
common law but the canon law of Rome, or corpus iuris canonici, which
originated in papal decrees, the earliest of which dated from the twelfth
century.6
The failure by papal delegate judges to dissolve the marriage of
Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon was one of the factors leading to
England's break with Rome in 1533-1534,"7 a break confirmed by the first
statute of Elizabeth I's reign, the Act of Supremacy, 1558.58 After the
Reformation, the canon law of marriage, or at least those parts of it not
inconsistent with the Reformation or repealed by statute, continued to be
applied by English ecclesiastical courts,59 although a new theoretical
foundation evolved to explain its place within English law. By tracing
through this evolution, the precise sense in which marriage was considered
a common law construct is revealed.
In Doctor and Student, written just before the Reformation, St.
German identified canon law and common law as distinct sources of law.6"
His purpose was to offer a restrictive interpretation of the scope of "the
lawe canon" and "the popes prerogatyue,"' but he did not question the
prevailing assumption, that in relation to spiritual matters, including the
basic definition of marriage, the church law of Rome did prevail--even to
54 R v. Millis (1843), 10 Cl. & Finn. 534 at 758 (H.L.) [Millis].
55R.H. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1974) at 3; William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 4 (London: Methuen & Co.,
1924) at 235-236.
56 Maitland, supra note 52 at 2; Blackstone, supra note 50 at 82.
Appeals to Rome were prohibited and the King's supremacy over spiritual matters was
confirmed by the Act in Restraint of Appeals, 1533, 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12 and the Act of Supremacy, 1534,
26 Hen. VIII, c. 1.
58 An Act Restoring to the Crown the Ancient Jurisdiction over the State Ecclesiastical and Spiritua
1558-1559, 1 Eliz. I, c. 1.
59 Proctorv. Proctor(1819), 2 Hag. Con. 292 at 300-301 [Proctor]. In general see Holdsworth,supra
note 55 at 272.
60 St. German, supra note 1 at 31-71.
61 Ibid. at 238ff.
2003]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the point of rendering conflicting Acts of Parliament "voyde."62 The post-
Reformation legal discourse was markedly different. In his report of
Caudrey's Case,63 Coke stated that the Act of Supremacy, 1558 did not
introduce "a new law" but was "declaratory" of the "ancient laws of the
realm" by which the Crown had always had "plenary and entire power"
over "all causes ecclesiastical or temporal." 64 However, Coke maintained
the clear distinction between temporal and spiritual laws. The "temporal
laws of England" governed "temporal causes," but "in causes ecclesiastical
and spiritual ... the conusance whereof belong not to the common laws of
England ... the same are to be determined and decided by ecclesiastical
judges, according to the King's ecclesiastical laws of this realm. '65 In a long
list of such causes that "belong not to the common laws," he included
"rights of matrimony., 66 Thus, after the Reformation, the corpus iuris
canonici was given an indigenous legal root fitting for England's
independence from Rome: its force in England derived not from papal
authority but from local "consent and custom. '67 It remained a discrete
body of law, separate substantively and institutionally from the common law
and the common law courts.
This general explanation was adopted and refined by Sir Matthew
Hale. He divided English law into lex non scripta, or laws derived from
immemorial usage and custom, and lex scripta, or laws derived from
legislative authority.68 He then divided lex non scripta into two categories:
the "Common Law in its usual and proper Acceptation," or general and
local customs acknowledged in common law courts, and "particular Laws,"
or the laws applied in admiralty, military, and church courts.69 In Hale's
scheme, canon law was lex non scipta because the various papal decrees
were part of English law only by virtue of "immemorial Usage and
Custom."70 English law never acknowledged any "Foreign" legislative
62 Ibid. at 246ff. See also St. German, ibid. at 315-340. Regarding parliament and marriage, see
supra note 1.
63 (1596), 5 Co. Rep. la (K.B.).
Ibid. at 8a-8b.
6 5 Ibid. at 8b-9a.
66 Ibid. at 9a. Also, see ibid. at 40a (ecclesiastical causes are "exempted from the jurisdiction of
the common law").
6 7 Ibid. at 9a.
68 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, 3d ed. (London: T. Waller, 1739)
at 1-2.
69 Ibid. at 24.
70 Ibid. at 26-28.
[VOL. 4 1, NO. I
EGALE and the Status of Marriage
authority;71 rather, canon laws had been "transposed ... into the Common
and Municipal Laws ' 72 through local usage. As such, canon laws were
"Leges sub graviori Lege" and the "Common Laws" retained a
"Superintendency" over them. 73 For Hale, canon and common law were
clearly distinct, but his analysis indicates that the distinction was beginning
to erode in subtle ways.
To Blackstone, this process of erosion was even more explicit. He
repeated Hale's analysis-that the corpus iuris canonici derived its authority
in England from immemorial usage and custom and was therefore part of
England's lex non scripta-but he described this body of unwritten law, of
which canon law was a part, as the "common law, or lex non scripta" of the
realm.74 In other words, Blackstone used common law as a synonym for
Hale's lex non scripta; however, in this context he meant it in an umbrella
sense of common law that remained distinct from the discrete bodies of law
it covered, including canon law and the common law "in its stricter and
more usual signification."75
By an important shift in the use of the term "common law," Hale
and Blackstone were able to assert something that Coke in Caudrey's Case
did not-that ecclesiastical law (and with, it the law of marriage) was both
a part of and separate from the English common law.7 6 Nineteenth-century
English judges accepted this theoretical explanation. Canon law obtained
status in England not as a "foreign" law, said Lord Blackburn in 1881, for
although it was not part of the common law in the "narrow sense," it could,
like equity, be regarded as part of the common law in its "wider sense."77
Indeed, the emergence of this umbrella sense of common law, which
embraced the customary adoption of the corpus iuris canonici in England,
reflects the shift to a modem conception of common law as any source of
law acknowledged by judges but not derived from legislation. The inclusion
71 Ibid. at 27.
I2 bid. at 28.
Ibid. at 43.
Blackstone, supra note 50 at 67, 80, and 82.
Ibid. at 67.
76The theory was no doubt implicit in Coke's report: he asserted that "by the ancient common
laws of this realm ... the King is the only supreme governor, as well over ecclesiastical persons, and in
ecclesiastical causes, as temporal," thus suggesting an umbrella sense of common law: See Caudrey's
Case, supra note 63 at 40a.
77Mackonochie v. Lord Penzance (1881), 6 A.C. 424 at 446, Blackburn L.J. Similarly, Sir John
Nicholls stated in Wilson v. M'Math (1819), 3 Phill. Ecc. R. 67 at 79 (Peculiars Ct. Canterbury): "the
whole canon law [now] rests for its authority in this country upon received usage"; "it is not binding here
proprio vigore" but is "part of the common law of the land, as a part of the lex non scripta."
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of marriage law under the common law umbrella did not mean, however,
that judges ceased to view marriage as derived from the cultural, moral, and
religious traditions of Europe. "[A]ll Christian Europe being one great
moral territory," said Lord Brougham in 1844, "[t]he presumption is that
the English law touching marriage is the same with the general law of
Catholic Europe."78 "[Tihe whole of our matrimonial law" in "matter and
form," said Sir William Scott in 1819, is "constructed upon" and has as "its
entire root ... the ancient canon law of Europe."79
As mentioned, the English common law of marriage acknowledged
both ecclesiastical and natural law sources. Indeed, it may be said that a
marriage law with continental origins was palatable to English judges in
part because its civil and canon law manifestations were regarded as mere
reflections of a natural law common to all nations. Marriage is "not merely
either a civil or religious contract," ruled Scott in 1795, but "a contract
according to the law of nature, antecedent to civil institution" arising
"wherever two persons of different sexes engage ... to live together ... for
the procreation and bringing up of children."8 In Dalrymple v. Dalrymple,81
Scott stated that marriage is "a contract of natural law" between "two
individuals of different sexes," and that the institution of marriage "is the
parent, not the child, of civil society"; civil and religious sanctions may have
been "superadded" to this institution, but its essence was determined by the
law of nature. Indeed, the classical natural law tradition that informed
English and other European laws characterized matrimony as the moral
precept upon which civil and political society depended. According to
Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Burlamaqui-who
were influential for common law lawyers like Blackstone-marriage was
originally a pre-political, or natural, state in which men and women united
for the purpose of having and raising children. It was commonly assumed
by these theorists that husbands had natural authority over wives and that,
from the combination of several families together under a common
78 Millis, supra note 54 at 691, 722.
79 Proctor, supra note 59 at 296, 301.
8 0 Lindo v. Belisario (1795), 1 Hag. Con. 216 at 230-231.
81 (1811), 2 Hag. Con. 54.
82 Ibid. at 63ff. See also Millis supra note 54 ("marriage ... [is] a civil contract flowing from the
natural law" at 806 and "the institution of marriage is older than any law; it may be said to exist by the
common law of all mankind" at 811).
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paterfamilias, the first political societies emerged.83 "Matrimony," said
Pufendorf, is the "source of families and furnishes, as it were, the material
for the establishment of governments and states";' marriage, he concluded,
was the basis of "organized social order."85 Notwithstanding this
theoretical-historical link to public institutions, marriage was regarded by
both Roman law and English law as a quintessential "private law" matter.s
The two basic features of this classical natural law account of
matrimony-procreation and authority of husbands over wives and
children-were premised on the assumption that marriage was
heterosexual. If homosexuality was addressed at all by such writers, it was
only to condemn it as a violation of natural law.87 It should be noted,
however, that the natural law account of marriage and sexual relations was
academic and theoretical and may not have been wholly reflective of
practical realities. As Justice Blair observed in Halpern, scholars have
recently argued that same-sex relationships occasionally received various
forms of official sanction and were acknowledged as a form of marriage, at
least in ancient and, to a lesser extent, early medieval times. 88
B. Marriage and Empire: Accommodating Legal, Cultural,
and Religious Pluralism
The common law references to natural law discussed above were,
in one sense, misleading. Natural law was viewed by English lawyers as
fixed, immutable, and universally authoritative across all human
communities. 89 However, English judges of the nineteenth century did not
characterize the definition of marriage in this way; to the contrary, they
expressly acknowledged that various cultures and religions defined
83 Samuel von Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, trans. by Charles Henry
Oldfather & William Abbott Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934) at 839-840; John Locke, "An
Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government" in Peter Laslett, ed., Two
Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 285 at 337-40, 354-55; Jean
Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural Law In Which The True Systems of Morality and Civil
Government Are Established, trans. by Thomas Nugent (London: J. Nourse, 1748) at 40-41.
Pufendorf, ibid.
85 Ibid. at 846.
86 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. by T.C. Sanders (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874) at
lib. i, tit. i, para. 4; Blackstone, supra note 50 at 410.
87 See e.g. Pufendorf, supra note 83 at 842.
88 Eskridge, supra note 8 at 17-42; John Boswell, Same-Sex Unions in Pre-Modern Europe (New
York: Villard Books, 1994) at 218-268. See Halpern, supra note 7 at 345-349.
89 Blackstone, supra note 50 at 41.
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marriage differently and that the common law in its wider sense could
accommodate these other conceptions of marriage. "If indeed there go two
things under one and the same name in different countries-if that which
is called marriage is of a different nature in each," observed Lord
Brougham in 1834, then, in the course of applying the lex loci contractus
when considering matrimonial issues arising in other nations, it was
necessary for judges to acknowledge these different conceptions of
marriage. 90 Marriage may be "one and the same thing substantially all the
Christian world over," he continued, but "it is important to observe, that we
regard it as a wholly different thing, a different status, from Turkish or
other marriages among infidel nations, because we clearly never should
recognise the plurality of wives."9' The departure from the common law
definition of marriage by the acknowledgment of polygamy was perhaps
most significant in the context of British India, in which Hindu and Muslim
marriage laws, including rules permitting polygamy, were regularly
recognized and applied by local British courts as well as the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. 92 Marriage in many non-Christian parts of
the British Empire was regarded, to use Lord Brougham's words, as
"something different" from the Christian conception of marriage, on which
Warrender v. Warrender (1834), 9 Bli. N.S. 89 at 112-113 (H.L.) [Warrender].
91 Ibid.
92The continuity of Hindu and Muslim laws in British India at common law was assumed,
although in some cases these laws were also acknowledged in legislation: Freeman v. Fairlie (1828), 1
Moo. Ind. App. 305 at 323-336. InArdaseer Cursetjee v. Perozeboye (1856), 10 Moo. P.C. 375 at 413-414
[Ardaseer], it was held that the Supreme Court at Bombay, which was granted jurisdiction to apply
"Ecclesiastical law as the same is now used and exercised in the Diocese of London," did not have
jurisdiction to entertain "a suit for restitution of conjugal rights" in which "the parties are Parsecs,
professing the religion of Zoroaster." The views of the dissenting judge in the court below that "such
a jurisdiction seems wholly inapplicable to Asiatics, whose creed admits of polygamy and great facilities
of divorce" was accepted by the Privy Council, which observed that "English Ecclesiastical law is
founded exclusively on the assumption that all the parties litigant are Christians," and "the Sudder
Adawlut at Bombay will take cognizance of matrimonial suits between Parsees" according to "their own
laws and customs" which are "wholly at variance with the principles which govern the matrimonial law
of the Diocese of London, and incompatible with the Ecclesiastical law" insofar as (for example) "the
husband is permitted to take a second wife, the first being [still] alive." See Ardaseer, ibid. at 415, 418,
and 419. In Advocate-General of Bengal v. Dossee (1863), 2 Moo. P.C. N.S. 22 at 62, an appeal from the
Supreme Court at Calcutta, Lord Kingsdown observed: "To apply the law which punishes the marrying
a second wife whilst the first is living, to a people amongst whom polygamy is a recognized institution,
would have been monstrous, and accordingly it has not been so applied [in British India]." In
RamalakshmiAmmalv. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar (1872), 14 Moo. Ind. App. 570 at 586,594 (P.C.)
[Ramalakshmi], an appeal from the High Court of Judicature at Madras involving rights of succession
to property of a deceased who had three wives simultaneously, Sir Montague Smith identified the
relevant Hindu customary laws governing the rights of "Sons by different Wives," considering in obiter
the customs relating to the "position of honour, and precedence" that the "first Wife" had over junior
wives.
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English matrimonial law was based. The important point is that nineteenth-
century judges did not refuse to apply the term marriage to these
relationships; non-Christian marriages, even polygamous ones, were
accepted as having "one and the same name," despite having a somewhat
"different nature."93 In other words, either the natural law that the common
law definition of marriage embraced varied from culture to culture and
from nation to nation, or the common law definition of marriage was not
really a natural law principle at all. Either way, the recognition by the
common law in its wider sense of marriages that did not meet the criteria
of the corpus iuris canonici confirms that marriage was seen by nineteenth-
century judges as a cultural or religious construct rather than an immutable
and universal norm. The English definition of marriage, it seems, was at
best a principle of European natural law.
As within the broader imperial constitutional order, so too, within
the colonies that joined to form the Dominion of Canada in 1867, national,
religious, and cultural pluralism was accommodated through varying
degrees of legal pluralism, with distinctive approaches to matrimony
adopted by British, French-Canadian, and Aboriginal communities. The
original three confederating provinces-Canada, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick-each had systems of law that, by section 129 of the
Constitution, continued in force after Confederation. Insofar as these laws
related to matters falling under section 92, they continued in force as
provincial laws subject to amendment or repeal by provincial legislatures;
insofar as they related to section 91 matters, they continued in force as
federal laws subject to amendment or repeal by the new federal
Parliament. 4 English law had been received into Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and that part of the Province of Canada that was previously
Upper Canada (and later Ontario).95 In that part of the Province of Canada
that was previously Lower Canada (and later Quebec), the Quebec Act,
1774 compromise still applied: English law governed criminal matters and
"the Laws of Canada" applied in relation to "Property and Civil Rights,"
or private law matters.96 The "Laws of Canada," or the civil law of New
France, consisted mainly of the Coutume de Paris supplemented by Roman
Warrender, supra note 90 at 112-113.
94 On section 129, see Jean Leclair, "R~flexions sur les probl~mes constitutionnelles soulev~s par
I'abrogation de Code civil du Bas-Canada" in The Harmonization of FederalLegislation with Quebec Civil
Law and Canadian Bijuralism: A Collection of Studies (Ottawa: Minister of Justice, 1997) 357.
95 See note 99 below.
96 Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. III, c. 83.
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law, legislation, and, in relation to marriage, canon laws.97 These various
sources were codified in 1866 by the Civil Code of Lower Canada. In
addition, Aboriginal customary laws on marriage continued to govern
certain Aboriginal communities, though no explicit written foundation for
these laws was included in the Constitution.98
In the common law jurisdictions, differences in marriage laws were
few. At the time that English law was introduced into Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and Upper Canada, 99 ecclesiastical courts still had jurisdiction
over matrimonial causes in England; nevertheless, no such church courts
were established in these colonies.1°° The emerging characterization in
England of marriage law as part of a wider sense of common law was
therefore consistent with the colonial institutional framework and with
judicial statements.101 However, the ecclesiastical/common law distinction
retained some importance. Upper Canada and, later, Ontario courts
determined matrimonial issues arising in the course of other (mainly
property) litigation, and it was unclear whether they had jurisdiction to
97 Murray Greenwood, "Lower Canada (Quebec): Transformation of Civil Law, From Higher
Morality to Autonomous Will, 1774-1866" (1996) 23 Man. LJ. 132 at 133.
98 Connollyv. Wooich andJohnson (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. S.C.) [Connolly]; aff'dJohnstone
v. Connolly (1869), 17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Que. Q.B.), recognized Aboriginal marriage customs in British
territories outside colonial boundaries. This case was followed in The Queen v. Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889),
1 Terr. LR. 211 (N.W.T. S.C.) in which Aboriginal marriage customs were recognized even after the
statutory introduction of English law and colonial government into the Northwest Territories. Late
nineteenth-century cases limit the recognition of Aboriginal marriage customs to communities in remote
locations. See Robb v. Robb (1891), 20 O.R. 591 at 596 (C.P.); Re Sheran (1899), 4 Terr. L.R. 83 at 91-93
(N.W.T. S.C.). Doubt may therefore exist as to whether pre-Confederation judges in Upper Canada,
for example, would in fact have acknowledged Aboriginal marriage customs. It isworth noting, however,
that government officials recognized the exercise of Aboriginal jurisdiction over marriage and family
law issues in mid-nineteenth-century Upper Canada. See Mark D. Walters, "'According to the Old
Customs of Our Nation': Aboriginal Self-Government on the Credit River Mississauga Reserve, 1826-
1847" (1998-99) 30 Ottawa L Rev. I at 37-39 [Walters, "Old Customs of Our Nation"].
99 English law was received in Nova Scotia in 1758, see Uniacke v. Dickson (1848), 2 N.S.R. 287
(Ch.); in New Brunswick in 1660, see Scott v. Scott (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 374 (N.B. A.D.); and in Upper
Canada in 1792, seeAn Act to introduce the English Law, 1792,32 Geo. III, c. 1 (U.C.), which introduced
English private law, English criminal law being already in force.
100 See generally Kimberley Smith Maynard, "Divorce in Nova Scotia, 1750-1890" in P. Girard
& J. Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 3 (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1990) 232;
William Renwick Riddell, "The Law of Marriage in Upper Canada" (1921) 2 Can. His. Rev. 226.
101 Chief Justice Robinson observed that the statutory introduction of the "law of England" into
upper Canada in 1792 included both English common and statute law, and this body of law "included
the law generally which related to marriage." See R v. Roblin (1862), 21 U.C.Q.B. 352 at 353 [Roblin].
InDoeexdem. Breakeyv. Breakey (1845), 2 U.C.Q.B. 349 at 355-356, he characterized the relevant rules
and principles as "the common law of England" on marriage, but elsewhere he still considered "the
canons" and works on "Ecclesiastical Law" when determining the content of this law: See Roblin, ibid.
at 355-356.
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entertain matrimonial causes directly.1"2 One such court held in 1930 that
"the jurisdiction exercised by the Ecclesiastical Courts of England in 1792
could not have been introduced into Upper Canada except by legislation,"
and because the legislation establishing Upper Canadian and Ontario
courts conferred only general common law and equity jurisdictions, the
courts lacked ecclesiastical jurisdiction over matrimonial causes (e.g.,
annulment).0 3 In relation to the critically important matter of judicial
jurisdiction, at that time, the common law did not include ecclesiastical
matters such as marriage, and special federal legislation was required to
remedy the problem.'04
In Lower Canada the integration of ecclesiastical laws on marriage
into the general law had not progressed to the same point as in Upper
Canada, in part due to the special position of the Roman Catholic Church.
It was said that the Catholic Church was a legally established church and
that under the pre-codified civil law of Lower Canada "le Droit Canon" and
"les lois de l'Eglise" governed the validity of marriages, with civil courts
merely adopting ecclesiastical rulings.0 5 In 1874 the Privy Council ruled
that, upon the British conquest of New France, the Catholic Church ceased
to be "an Established Church in the full sense of the term," but under the
Quebec Act, 1774 it continued to be "a Church recognised by the State."t °
Sir Robert Phillimore ruled that, although "there are now in Canada no
regular Ecclesiastical Courts" as there were under the French regime, "a
bishop is always a judex ordinaries" and, "according to the general canon
law," a bishop "may hold a Court and deliver judgment."'" Indeed, the civil
courts in Lower Canada did defer to ecclesiastical authorities on
matrimonial issues. In 1848 one court held that, "chez les catholiques, le
mariage dtant un sacrement" and therefore "l'autorit6 civile ne'en peut
prononcer la dissolution, et ne fait que donner l'effet civil apr~s que la
sentence a W prononc6e par le tribunal comp6tent"-"l'autorit6
102 Lawless v. Chamberlain (1889), 18 O.R. 296 at 297-298 (Ch.), Boyd Ch.
103 Vamvakidis v. Kirkoff, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 877 at 890 (Ont. C.A.).
104 The Divorce Act (Ontario), S.C. 1930, c. 14, gave Ontario courts authority to entertain
annulment and divorce actions. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, divorce courts had been established
prior to confederation. See Maynard, supra note 100.
105 E. Lef. De Bellefeuille, "Code Civil du Bas-Canada: lgislation Sur le Mariage" (1864) 1
Revue canadienne 602 at 606-609.
106 Brown v. Les Cure et Marguilliers de L'Oeuvre et Fabrique de Notre Dame de Montrdal (1874),
L.R. 6 P.C. App. 157 at 206.
107 Ibid. at 211.
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ecclesiastique. ' 8
Article 127 of the 1866 Civil Code recognized that this ecclesiastical
jurisdiction enjoyed by the Catholic Church over marriage between
Catholics also existed in other churches over their communities.'o One
authority said that the purpose of this provision in the Civil Code was
unambiguous: "il est la cons6cration d'un 6tat social et religieux existant
avant le code civil"; the point was to "conserve au mariage son caract~re
religieux," recognizing "[le] droit canonique de chaque 6glise, les r~gles de
celle-ci ce qui concerne la capacit6 de se marier et la c616bration du
mariage."' 0 Indeed, the Civil Code was interpreted this way and, after
Confederation, the courts followed the pre-Confederation practice by civil
courts of deferring to ecclesiastical authorities on the validity of
marriages."' Finally, judges in Lower Canada/Quebec shared with English
judges similar views about the moral foundations of matrimony. In
Connolly, decided in the year of Canadian Confederation, Justice Monk
recognized and applied the Aboriginal marriage customs of the Cree
nation, having first reviewed the history of European ideas about marriage
and having concluded that civil, common, and canon laws reflected a
principle of matrimony common to all peoples, even non-Christians-a
principle founded on the natural law.12
C. Implications for Constitutional Interpretation
Having reviewed the evolution of the law of matrimony both at
English common law and within the larger British imperial context, with
particular emphasis on pre-Confederation law in Canada, it is now possible
to consider more accurately the difficult issues created by the assumption
that marriage in subsection 91(26) of the Constitution must have
incorporated constitutionally the common law definition of marriage in
108 Lussierv. Archambault (1848), 11 L.C. Jur. 53 at 54 (Q.B.), Rolland C.J. See also, Vaillancourt
v. Lafontaine (1866), 11 LC. Jur. 305 (S.C.).
109 Art. 127 C.C.L.C. provides: "The other impediments [to a valid marriage] recognized according
to the different religious persuasions, as resulting from relationship or affinity or from other causes,
remain subject to the rules hitherto followed in the different churches and religious communities."
110 A.A. Bruneau, Question de Droi, Du Mariage (Montreal: G. Ducharme, 1921) at 20-21, 25.
Laramie v. Evans (1881), 25 L.C. Jur. 261 (S.C.); Globensky v. Wilson (1886), 2 M.L.R. 174
(S.C.). The Privy Council would later reject the view that civil law was bound by ecclesiastical law on this
point; see Despatie v. Tremblay, [1921] 1 A.C. 702 (P.C.). But this decision did not reflect the state of
the law in 1867: J.E.C. Brierley, "Husband and Wife in the Law of Quebec" in Derek Mendes da Costa,
ed., Studies in Canadian Famil Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) 795 at 806.
112 Connolly, supra note 98 at 97. See Connolly, ibid. at 97-102 for Justice Monk's historical and
comparative account.
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1867. EGALE is premised on the propositions that, in 1867, marriage was
regarded as a relationship created by the common law, that the definition
of marriage as the union of one man and one woman for life was judge-
made law, and that because marriage was a legal construct, it followed that
the use of the word marriage in subsection 91(26) should be assumed to
incorporate or entrench that legal construct. Even if it is accepted that the
living-tree doctrine applies to the present-day interpretation of subsection
91(26)-as I have argued it must-it is still necessary to consider the
preliminary conclusion that the constitutional meaning of marriage
necessarily incorporates the pre-existing common law meaning. Three
important reasons emerge from the analysis of marriage within English
common law and the larger imperial context, including pre-Confederation
Canada, for concluding that this mechanical equation between
constitutional law and common law is highly inappropriate.
First, it is clear that mid-nineteenth-century English judges would
have rejected the idea that marriage either was a common law construct or
the result of judge-made law. In their view, marriage in England was an
integral part of a pan-European-Christian intellectual and cultural
tradition; it was reflected in religious edicts and linked to European
conceptions of natural law. The common law did not create the relationship
of marriage any more than it created families, friendship, or religion;
indeed, the statements of judges and commentators examined above
confirm that the common law was respectful of the fact that it had not
created the institution of marriage. The common law, properly speaking,
did not include a law of matrimony, and the common law, broadly defined,
purported merely to acknowledge a social and religious custom that was
regarded by Europeans as a moral principle that pre-existed and supported,
rather than derived from, law and legal systems. If the common law in 1867
merely acknowledged marriage as a pre-existing social-religious-moral
phenomenon, why should we accept the conclusion that marriage, as used
in subsection 91(26), referred to a technical legal construct? The common
law gloss on the social-religious-moral conception of marriage was so thin
and insignificant that it seems far more plausible to read the constitutional
reference to marriage as a direct reference to the social-religious-moral
conception itself, as opposed to the constitutional entrenchment of a
common law concept. It may be argued in response to this point that, today,
it makes no practical difference whether marriage in subsection 91(26) is
considered to incorporate the common law or simply to reflect a social-
religious-moral custom, so long as the living-tree interpretative principle is
applied to ensure that its present meaning coheres with present-day
conditions and expectations. I will return to this important argument below.
The second significant point to emerge from the above analysis of
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the common law of marriage relates to nineteenth-century judges'
relativistic conception of marriage. Because the common law in its wider
sense merely acknowledged Christian-European customs, it was also
capable of acknowledging different conceptions of marriage followed in
other cultures and religions found within the British Empire. Despite
references to a universal natural law, the common law took a culturally
contingent approach to marriage. The assertion that marriage in subsection
91(26) must be taken as incorporating the existing legal construction of
marriage simply begs a question: Which legal construction? In its wide
sense, the common law was simply an empty container, ready to receive and
hold whatever conception of marriage was appropriate in light of the social-
religious-moral customs of the relevant community.
The third point follows from the second. Even if it is accepted that
the definition of marriage had a singular, concrete common law status in
1867, that common law concept could not have been transposed directly
into the Constitution. The "grand entrance hall" '113 to the Constitution, as
Chief Justice Lamer described the Constitution's preamble, which proclaims
a desire to have a "constitution similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom," thus confirming that a principal source of Canadian public law
is the British common law tradition. However, the Constitution also
recognizes, in a less grand way, non-common law systems, particularly in the
private law sphere. As a result, in areas of private law-including
marriage-the common law cannot provide a direct or sole source of
constitutional principle. If some historical-legal context is to be taken as
informing the meaning of words used in the Constitution enacted in 1867,
then the civil law system of pre-Confederation Quebec must be included
with the common law tradition as part of that historical-legal context, at
least in relation to constitutional references to matters of private law such
as marriage. The same might also be said for Aboriginal customary law. As
Viscount Haldane observed in the course of interpreting solemnization of
marriage in section 92(12), "[t]he common law of England and the law of
Quebec before Confederation" would "naturally have been in the minds"
of the framers of the Constitution."'
The brief account of the state of the laws of marriage in 1867
suggests what would have been in the minds of the common and civil
lawyers who framed the Constitution. In Upper Canada, the English process
of blurring the distinction between canon and common law was well under
way, although the distinction remained important when defining judicial
113 Provincial Judges, supra note 5 at 78.
114 Re Marriage Legislation in Canada, [1912] A.C. 880 at 887 (P.C.).
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jurisdiction over matrimonial causes. In Lower Canada the law regarding
the validity of marriages was still canon law, and civil judges deferred to
ecclesiastical authorities on its application. Finally, to the extent that judges
thought about Aboriginal customary laws at all, they accepted differences
so long as basic (European) conceptions of natural law were respected.
Given their common roots in the corpus iuris canonici and the European
natural law tradition, we can assume that, in 1867, both common law and
civil law systems would have defined marriage as the union of one man and
one woman for life. However, it is clear that the general point made above
in relation to English law is equally applicable to pre-Confederation
Canadian law: marriage was not viewed by judges as a construct of civil or
common law but as a social-religious-moral phenomenon acknowledged by
the law. Lower Canadian civil law echoed the traditional common law view
that the law merely confirmed "un 6tat social et religieux." The same
conclusion also follows: if the law expressly acknowledged marriage in this
way in 1867, then it is not obvious that the framers of the Constitution used
the word marriage in subsection 91(26) differently, instead referring to a
technical term created by law. Once the civil law of Lower Canada is
factored into the interpretative context of subsection 91(26)-as it must
be-it is even less plausible to suggest that the brand of legal positivism
underlying EGALE in relation to the concept of marriage would have been
accepted by judges and legislators in 1867 than it was when only the
common law context was considered."'
Aside from the importance of considering substantive approaches
to marriage in both common and civil law when interpreting the historical
legal context of the Constitution, the mere fact that both systems are part
of that legal context means that the simple, direct incorporation of the
common law definition of marriage into the Constitution is impossible;
marriage in 1867 was defined in Canada by several legal systems. 116 At best,
it could be said that the reference to marriage in subsection 91(26) refers
to the common core elements of marriage that both common law and civil
law acknowledged: one could compare the two systems, derive common
115 And even if Aboriginal customary law weighed lightly in the minds of judges and legislators
at the time, it is worth observing that the rejection of legal positivism in this respect would have been
consistent with the law, which generally denied strict analytical distinctions between spirituality, social
custom, and law: see Walters, "Old Customs of Our Nation", supra note 98 at 6-14.
116 In the modern context, the continuity of Aboriginal marriage customs is probably less
important for the interpretation of marriage and more important for the general question of whether
sections 91 and 92 as a whole affect residual spheres of Aboriginal self-government. Campbell, supra
note 45 cited, interalia, the recognition of continuity of Aboriginal marriage customs in Connolly, supra
note 98, in holding that these sections are not inconsistent with a residual sphere of Aboriginal self-
government.
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principles from both, and synthesize them to produce a hybrid unwritten
legal norm that could then be said to have been incorporated and
constitutionalized by the Constitution. However, the construction of this
hybrid norm would simply be the stripping away of the common law-civil
law veneer from the institution of marriage to expose the basic European
social-religious-moral idea of matrimony then prevailing. It simply cannot
be said that a particular pre-existing law was entrenched in the Constitution
by the word marriage.
It follows from these three points that reading the constitutional
word marriage as a reference to a pre-existing legal construct, as opposed
to a prevailing social-religious-moral custom, is at best questionable and at
worst erroneous. Even if one were to accept Justice Pitfield's modified
original-intent argument as valid-that the living-tree doctrine is
inapplicable to constitutional references to legal constructs-it is hardly
obvious that that argument applies in relation to marriage in subsection
91(26). However, the modified original-intent argument is deeply
problematic, and it is far more reasonable to accept that the living-tree
doctrine applies to all constitutional words and phrases, even constitutional
references to pre-existing legal constructs. If this approach is accepted, then
the question mentioned above arises: so long as the living-tree principle is
applied to the present-day interpretation of marriage, what difference does
it make if the word's historical meaning is taken as referring to a pre-
existing legal construct or to a pre-existing social-religious-moral custom?
This argument must now be addressed.
In general, it is inappropriate to take constitutional words or
phrases that had at the time the Constitution was framed a clear common
law or other legal meaning and mechanically equate the constitutional
meaning of the word with that pre-existing common law or other legal
meaning. Such an approach to constitutional interpretation would permit
judges to circumvent the normal process of constitutional construction,
which requires an express consideration of substantive moral, political, or
other factors relevant to a proper determination of what the word or phrase
ought to mean (or to have meant) in its constitutional context. The
mechanical equation-constitutional word X equals common law rule
X-permits judges to avoid having to address, let alone acknowledge, the
existence of difficult interpretative choices that the construction of
constitutional provisions normally requires. In response, it might be argued
that so long as this sort of mechanical constitutional law-common law
equation is only an initial step in constitutional interpretation, the obvious
deficiencies in the initial constitutional law-common law equation are cured
by the later consideration of the shifting social-moral-political factors that
must inevitably be considered at the living-tree stage of analysis.
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This response does not adequately address the problem. The second
living-tree step in the interpretative process does not occur in a vacuum.
The inquiry is not "What should this constitutional word mean today?"
Rather, it involves this type of question: "In light of the fact that this word
originally meant X, is there any legal, moral, political, or other justification
for concluding that its meaning has shifted over time so that it now means
Y?" Courts do not regard the living-tree doctrine as a licence to rewrite the
constitutional text so that it reads as contemporary judges think it ought to
read. 17 Rather, judges have insisted that in applying the living-tree
doctrine, the historical starting point for the analysis matters. The doctrine
is, after all, about the growth of constitutional meaning, and it must involve
an intertemporal dimension to the construction of words and phrases-a
consideration of whether previous understandings of their meanings still
prevail in subsequent interpretative contexts. The constitutional tree is
"rooted in past and present institutions," writes Justice McLachlin, and its
proper interpretation requires "a philosophy which is capable of explaining
the past and animating the future"; thus, "[h]istory is important" to the
application of the living-tree doctrine in so far as it suggests "the philosophy
underlying the development" of the constitutional right or provision in
question.1 in short, we cannot reasonably know where the meaning of a
constitutional provision is going unless we know from whence it has
come-a point acknowledged in Hendricks. 9 The historical starting point
will inform subsequent growth and will invariably preclude certain proposed
new interpretations: in some cases the suggested interpretative
development might amount to the creation, in the words of Justice
lacobucci, of "some new doctrine" that would involve "something more
than a living-tree approach," wholly inconsistent with relevant "historical
fact[s] .,120
Returning to the relationship between constitutional words and the
common law, if the preliminary meaning of the constitutional word is taken,
in a mechanical way, to be the same as the pre-existing common law, then
the next question in the inquiry-has the meaning grown with our living-
117 See e.g. R v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. ("the 'living tree' theory has its
limits and has never been used to transform completely a document or add a provision which was
specifically rejected at the outset" at 236).
118 Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 at 180-181, 187.
119 Hendricks, supra note 7 at para. 116: "L'intention initiale du 16gislateur ne doit pas 8tre ignor6e
mais une interpr6tation dynamique oblige A ne pas se limiter strictement au sens qu'avaient les termes
de ia Constitution en 1867 ce qui nierait toute la souplesse et la flexibilit6 de cette loi pour r6pondre
aux r6alit~s et besoins nouveaux de la soci6t6 canadienne."
12 0 British Columbia (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41 at 87.
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tree constitution?-may yield a different answer from that obtained if the
starting point in the analysis is that the constitutional word did not initially
refer to a concrete legal construct but, rather, its meaning was simply
informed by a social, moral, or political opinion existing at the time. In the
latter scenario, a possibility of dynamism is already built into the analysis:
the meaning of the word is acknowledged as directly contingent upon or the
direct product of its social, moral, or political context. In the former
scenario, the possibility of dynamism still exists, but it may be held hostage
to particular judicial jurisprudential attitudes concerning the nature of law
and its relation to shifting social and moral contexts. There is, in short, a
danger that the characterization of the word as a legal construct may, for
some judges, mean that the word begins the living-tree interpretative
process with an added degree of definitional rigidity. To avoid distorting
the interpretative process, it is better to challenge rigorously the mechanical
equation between constitutional law and common law in the first place. It
may well be that reading a constitutional word as a reference to a common
law concept before subjecting it to the living-tree interpretative process is
perfectly justifiable, but that conclusion must be based on principled and
reasoned analysis, not mechanical assumption. This approach will lead, in
general, to a more coherent model of principled constitutional analysis in
a modern context. In light of recent trends in the case law towards
acknowledging various sorts of unwritten or common law constitutional
principles, it is necessary to be careful and precise about the relationship
between written constitutional texts and unwritten, or common law,
principles. A purely mechanical equation between common law and
constitutional written texts would be appropriate only in relation to the
most technical of narrow common law constructs-for example, a
constitutional phrase such as "seised as of Freehold ... of Lands ... held in
Free and Common Socage. '1 21 Marriage, however, is not such a word. It can
be read as a technical legal term, but it can also be read in other ways. As
a result, some convincing and principled argument must be made for
reading it one way or the other-even before a consideration of whether its
meaning has shifted pursuant to the living-tree doctrine.
III. MARRIAGE, COMMON LAW, AND LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY IN 1867
Even if the framers of the Constitution used the word marriage in
a technical-legal sense, there is no need to apply the living-tree rule of
121 Declaration of Qualification of Senators, Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.
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construction to see if that sense of the word still applies under the modern
Constitution unless the legalistic sense of marriage used in 1867 was
regarded as binding upon Parliament. If the technical-legal sense of
marriage was not regarded as binding Parliament, then resort to the living-
tree rule is unnecessary to show that the current Parliament has the
authority to depart from the historical definition of marriage.
In this respect it is important to distinguish between historical
attitudes about political realities and historical attitudes about legal powers.
On the basis of the account of the social, religious, and moral assumptions
about marriage provided above, it is fair to assume that in 1867 it would
have been unthinkable that Parliament would enact same-sex marriage
legislation. However, it would also have been unthinkable that members of
the legal community-legislators, lawyers, and judges-would have
acknowledged a legal rule preventing same-sex marriage legislation in 1867.
There was, of course, a long tradition in jurisprudential and
common law thought according to which natural law, divine law, or other
fundamental principles of law prevailed over acts of Parliament."' By the
nineteenth century, however, the theoretical supremacy of natural law over
legislation had been subordinated to the emerging doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, according to which Parliament was considered
to be legally omnipotent-at least in relation to the legislative powers of the
United Kingdom, or imperial Parliament.n The position of colonial
legislatures within the British Empire was, in this respect, somewhat less
clear, even as late as the 1860s.24 When Justice Benjamin Boothby of the
South Australia Supreme Court began striking down colonial statutes on
the grounds that they violated fundamental principles of English law, local
political reaction was one of horrified disbelief. The judicial review of
legislation was, a committee of the Legislative Council concluded,
"abhorrent" to the principles of the English Constitution.'2 However, the
law officers of the Crown were receptive to the theoretical possibility of a
natural law limitation on colonial legislative authority. In 1862 the Attorney
and Solicitor Generals in the United Kingdom concluded that colonial
legislatures were constrained not only by imperial statutes that extended to
122 Walters, "Common Law Constitution", supra note 4 at 105-120.
123 Logan v. Burslem (1842), 4 Moo. P.C. 284 at 292,296; Lee v. Bude and Torrington Junction Rly.
Co. (1871), L.R. 6 C.P. 576 at 582.
124 Walters, "Common Law Constitution", supra note 4 at 120-128.
125 "Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, Upon Recent Decisions and
Conduct of Mr. Justice Boothby," 27 August 1861, in U.K., H.C., "Correspondence Between the
Governor of South Australia and the Secretary of State, Relative to Mr. Boothby", Cmnd 3048 in
Sessional Papers, vol. 37 (1862) 22-23 ["Boothby Correspondence"].
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the colony but also, implicitly, by fundamental principles of English law.26
According to this theory, as it was accepted by the imperial ministry, the
range of fundamental principles of English law that constrained colonial
legislative power was so narrow as to be practically unimportant: the
relevant principles were those of "natural jurisprudence"'1 27 that were
"equally applicable in the nature of things to all Her Majesty's Christian
Subjects in every part of the British dominions," such as Crown sovereignty,
laws against slavery, the right not to be punished without trial,
and-significantly for present purposes-laws prohibiting polygamy."2 In
other words, if a colonial statute on the subject of marriage purported to
alter the English legal definition of marriage by permitting polygamy among
Christians it would, according to this view, have been void as repugnant to
European natural law principles embedded in English law. It is not
unreasonable to assume, in light of historical attitudes towards
homosexuality, that a colonial statute purporting to alter the English legal
definition of marriage by permitting same-sex marriages would have been
held void, under this view, for the same reasons.
The implications of this theory were troubling for the imperial
ministry: the judicial review of colonial legislation on general natural law
principles as manifested in English law was inconsistent with the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty established in relation to the British
Parliament and was generally unacceptable to British political-legal culture
at the time. In direct response to the Boothby affair, the imperial
Parliament enacted the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865.129 This Act
confirmed that there was only one ground on which courts could hold
colonial statutes to be invalid-repugnancy to imperial statute. The idea
that legislative power was constrained by natural jurisprudence embedded
in English law was repudiated by section 3 of the Act, which stated: "No
Colonial Law shall be or be deemed to have been void or inoperative on the
Ground of Repugnancy to the Law of England." Reading section 3 of the
Act in light of the law officers' opinion that prompted its enactment, it is
clear that, after 1865, colonial legislatures were to be considered as being,
126 W. Atherton, Attorney General, and Roundell Palmer, Solicitor General, to Duke of
Newcastle, 12 April 1862, in "Boothby Correspondence," ibid. at 68-69.
127This was the expression used by the imperial government when it informed the South
Australian government of the law officers' opinion: Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, to Sir Dominic Daly, Governor of South Australia, 24 April 1862, in "Boothby
Correspondence," ibid. at 66-67.
128 Atherton and Palmer, supra note 127 at 69-70.
129 (U.K.), 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 [Colonial Laws Validity Act]. See Walters, "Common Law
Constitution", supra note 4 at 128.
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and as having been, empowered to enact statutes that violated rules of
English common law and the principles of natural law embedded therein.
These legislatures were trusted to exercise their legislative powers wisely,
and any transgressions could be remedied by either imperial statute or use
of the imperial Crown's disallowance power. 3° As the Supreme Court of
Canada acknowledged in the Patriation Reference, the Colonial Laws
Validity Act "was intended to be a liberating statute ... from subservience
to British common law.
131
In relation to the question of marriage, the effect of the Colonial
Laws Validity Act is obvious. The traditional definition of marriage was
clearly regarded as a potential constraint on colonial legislatures before the
Act, insofar as the rule against polygamy between Christians was thought
to be one of the rules of natural jurisprudence beyond colonial legislative
competence. The purpose of the Act was to confirm that these constraints
on colonial legislative competence did not exist. After 1865, colonial
statutes enacted before or after that date altering the English legal
definition of marriage by permitting polygamy would have been held valid,
so long as no imperial statute extending to the colony was violated. The
English common law, including the definition of marriage, did not operate
as a legal constraint on colonial legislatures.132 It follows that colonial
legislation altering the English legal definition of marriage by permitting
same-sex marriages would also have been valid.
This was the state of the law on the eve of Confederation in relation
to the colonies that united to form the new Dominion of Canada under the
Constitution, or, as it was called, the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA
Act). If colonial legislatures in Canada could have enacted same-sex
marriage legislation before Confederation, did the legislatures recognized
or created under the BNA Act lack that power? In other words, if section
3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act expressly removed any English common
law constraint on colonial legislative authority over, inter alia, the definition
of marriage, did subsection 91(26) of the BNA Act reimpose it? In
answering this question it is important to appreciate that the ColonialLaws
Validity Act continued to apply to Canadian legislatures after 1867; it
applied until it was repealed for Canada and other dominions by the Statute
130 See generally D.B. Swinfen, Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation, 1813-1865 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970).
131 Reference ReAmendment of the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 794.
132 Phillips v. Eyre (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1. See Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and
Colonial Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1966) 400.
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of Westminster, 1931. 33 As a result, a complete statement of Canadian
legislative power at this time would include both sections 91 and 92 of the
BNA Act and section 3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. If section 91,
which gives the federal Parliament authority to make laws for the peace,
order, and good government of Canada, including laws in relation to
marriage, is read together with section 3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act,
which says no Canadian law shall be void on the ground of repugnancy to
the "Law of England" unless repugnant to some imperial statute, and if the
historical context of section 3 is kept in mind, the argument that Canadian
legislatures were constrained by the English common law definition of
marriage becomes untenable. It is difficult to see how the express statement
in the 1865 Act permitting legislatures to enact laws repugnant to English
law-that is, in effect, the granting of power to enact same-sex marriage
laws-was somehow repealed or limited by provisions in the 1867 Act that
empower the federal Parliament to enact laws relating to marriage. The
only rational way to read these provisions together consistently is to
conclude that the federal Parliament had exclusive legislative authority to
enact laws in relation to marriage and that it was, in the exercise of that
power, in no way bound by English law, including the common law
definition of marriage. Indeed, when courts interpreted these two Acts
together, they consistently held that Canadian legislatures, provincial and
federal, were given plenary, sovereign, or supreme legislative authority over
internal matters as ample as that of the imperial Parliament itself (which
was, by then, regarded as legally omnipotent under the theory of
parliamentary sovereignty), subject only to the imperial constitution and the
constraint of federalism-that federal statutes could not infringe provincial
spheres of power, and vice versa."'a Unless it can be shown that the federal
marriage power must be constrained by the English legal definition of
marriage in order to avoid infringement of provincial powers, it must be
concluded that English law, or the rules of natural jurisprudence embedded
133(U.K.), 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 4. See generally Sir Kenneth Wheare, The Statute of Westminster
and Dominion Status, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949).
134 Re Goodhue (1872), 19 Gr. / U.C. Ch. 366 at 382, 385-386 (Ont. C.A.); B. v. Brierly (1887), 14
O.R. 525 at 531,533 (Ch.); Re The Criminal Code, 1892, Sections 275-276, Relating to Bigamy (1897), 27
S.C.R. 461 at 491-94, Ginounard J. and at 480, Gwynne J.; Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 A.C. 117 at
132 (P.C.); Dunphy v. Croft, [1931] S.C.R. 531 at 539-540, Newcombe J. Also A.V. Dicey, "Unjust and
Impolitic Provincial Legislation" (1909) 45 Can. L.J. 457; W.H.P Clement, The Law of the Canadian
Constitution, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1904) 57; Walters, "Common Law Constitution", supra note
4 at 131-133. Aside from imperial legislation extending to a colony, unwritten principles of the imperial
constitution may also have constrained colonial legislatures-see e.g. legislation affecting the imperial
Crown's royal prerogative (such as the right to entertain appeals from colonial courts) was held invalid
due to its extra-territoriality: Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.) (see Wheare, ibid. at 88-99).
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therein, were not regarded in 1867 as constraining federal legislative
authority over marriage. However, this constraint cannot be shown. As seen
above, federal same-sex marriage laws would not violate any sphere of
provincial legislative competence, and therefore it cannot be said that the
federal marriage power must be constrained by the common law definition
of marriage to avoid conflict with provincial powers. As a result, a historical
reading of the BNA Act with the Colonial Laws Validity Act leads to the
conclusion that the English common law definition of marriage could not
have represented a limitation on the federal marriage power in 1867.
Section 3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act was essentially re-
enacted as section 2(2) of the Statute of Westminster, 1931 and is still
technically in force in Canada today as part of the supreme Constitution of
Canada defined by section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In other words,
there is an express written provision in the Constitution to the effect that the
federal Parliament of Canada is not bound by the English common law
(including, inter alia, the common law definition of marriage) when enacting
legislation. Whether this provision has any meaningful force today is open
to question; for example, it is unlikely that it would capture English
common law rules that are now regarded as Canadian common law rules.
However, in considering the historical status of Canadian legislative
authority for the purposes of identifying a starting point for a living-tree
analysis, this issue is not relevant. The history of the Colonial Laws Validity
Act confirms that, in 1867, the common law definition of marriage could not
have represented a constitutional limitation on Canadian parliamentary
sovereignty. Therefore, there is no need to argue that the scope of that
power has grown pursuant to the living-tree rule of construction to include
the power to enact same-sex marriage legislation.
IV. CONCLUSION
A general theory of the relationship between the common, or
unwritten, law and Canadian constitutional law is still only implicit in the
case law. It is still somewhat unclear what sort of principled argument must
be made before the conclusion is accepted that a given common law or
unwritten norm is part of the supreme Constitution binding on both federal
and provincial legislatures. The free-standing and text-emergent unwritten
norms that have been acknowledged as part of the supreme Constitution in
Canada thus far do, however, share a number of characteristics. First, they
are not necessarily narrow common law concepts that might have been
enforced historically by English common law courts; on the contrary, they
seem for the most part to form part of the common law in the broad sense,
or, as Hale would say, leges non scripta based on custom, usage, and
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consent.1 35 That the institution of marriage was part of the common law in
its broad sense, then, is not in itself a reason to conclude that the common
law definition of marriage cannot be a constitutional norm. However, it is
fair to say that the unwritten constitutional norms thus far acknowledged
by courts have special features that the common law definition of marriage
lacks. They are principles of public law that may be characterized in one or
more of the following ways: they are uncontroversial when stated in abstract
form (e.g., democracy, the rule of law, judicial independence); they are
considered essential to the institutional structure of the Constitution (e.g.,
parliamentary privileges); and they are essential to protecting arrangements
between communities on which constitutional order was founded (e.g.,
federalism, Aboriginal self-government). 36 Other categories of unwritten
constitutional law no doubt exist, but it is fair to say that, however such
norms are characterized, it will be necessary to demonstrate that their
status as supreme constitutional laws is somehow essential to the coherence
of the Constitution as a whole when interpreted in today's light.
Of course it was not suggested in the EGALE judgment that the
common law definition of marriage is part of the unwritten constitution.
The common law of marriage was treated instead as a text-incorporated
common law rule, and the identification of such norms requires a different,
and often less rigorous, form of justification from free-standing and text-
emergent unwritten norms. I have argued, however, that when there is
considerable distance between the incorporated common law rule and the
written text that is said to incorporate it, a principled judicial justification
is required before the conclusion is accepted that the common law rule is
part of supreme constitutional law, and that the form that this justification
must take may not differ very much from the justifications necessary for
genuinely unwritten constitutional norms.
It is not possible to consider here the sorts of principled arguments
that might be made to justify the conclusion that the common law definition
of marriage has been incorporated into the supreme Constitution by the
mere use of the word marriage, but it is fair to say that the justification will
have to be analytically rigorous, including a careful and complete
assessment of exactly what the common law was and how it related to its
broader social, political, and moral context. The written text of the
Canadian Constitution does not enshrine a particular substantive definition
of marriage; it simply gives the federal Parliament exclusive legislative
135 Walters, "Common Law Constitution", supra note 4 at 98.
136 These points can, I think, be inferred from the following line of cases: Provincial Judges, supra
note 5; Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 5; New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia
(Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; and Campbell, supra note 45.
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authority over marriage. Although the position of the institution of
marriage as a common law concept in the broader sense does not disqualify
it from consideration as a constitutional norm, it certainly precludes any
mechanical equation between the common law and textual references to the
word. Furthermore, the legally plural context of the Canadian Constitution
may, in certain cases, prohibit the direct incorporation of English or British
common law concepts into the text. At least in relation to textual references
to private law matters, the civil law of pre- and post-Confederation Quebec
will be important; in these and other instances, Aboriginal legal
perspectives may be important as well. Finally, careful consideration must
be given to the nature of the common law rule, or unwritten law, and
whether it was historically regarded as binding on legislatures. The
conclusion in this respect will not be determinative of the status of the rule
in today's Constitution, but it will provide a clear starting point for analysis.
Once this historical point of reference is established, the focus of attention
can then be turned to the central question: Is the inclusion of the unwritten
norm important for the coherence of the Constitution as the normative
foundation for a just political and social order in Canada today?
This kind of principled analysis is required before it can be said that
the common law definition of marriage has been incorporated into the
supreme Constitution of Canada. No such analysis was presented in the
EGALE judgment. Whileit can be accepted that families and marriage were
regarded historically as essential to civil society, and that order and stability
within the present Canadian constitutional system is in some way
dependent on these institutions, it must also be accepted that Canada is a
secular, liberal, and legally/culturally/nationally plural state in which the
actual definitions of families and marriage are very much contested. As a
result, it is appropriate to conclude that the definition of marriage is left to
majoritarian democratic will as exercised in Parliament subject to the
discipline of the Charter.
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